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Article 3

Articles
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HIGHER LIFE FORMS: THE
PATENT SYSTEM AND CONTROVERSIAL
TECHNOLOGIES
ROBERT P. MERGES*

This article reaches four conclusions. First, animals should not
be excluded from patent protection for ethical or economic reasons;
both animal treatment and farm policy are and should be outside
the purview of the patent system.
Second, most of the problems that will result from patentable
animals will be practical, e.g., detecting infringement and enforcing
rights. Private contracts between patentees and their customers can
be expected to solve many of these problems, and the market demand for devices to detect infringement will solve many more.
Third, current law fails to adequately address the rights of
animal owners and patentees over the offspring of patented animals.
Congress should consider enacting legislation paralleling the
farmer's crop exemption' of the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970,2 which permits a farmer to use next-generation seed produced by a protected plant variety. The proposed legislation would
allow farmers to sell or breed the offspring of patented animals
without paying further royalties to the patentee.
Fourth, because of the importance of public sector agencies in
agricultural research and development, Congress should consider
clarifying the court-made research exemption from patent infringement.' Private rights should not hinder public research.
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. B.S., Carnegie-Mellon
University, 1981; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1988.
This article is based on Congressional testimony prepared while I was the Julius Silver
Fellow in Law, Science and Technology, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank
Professor Harold Edgar of Columbia Law School for his comments, and for the financial
assistance of Columbia's Julius Silver Program in Law, Science and Technology. I also
thank Ed Ching, Ph.D., Barry Gonetzky, Ph.D., and Cathy Roseman, M.S., for their help
on questions of science, and David Beier of the HouseJudiciary Committee for lengthy
and rewarding discussions of the policy issues. Alas, I alone am responsible for the final
content.
1. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1982)).
3. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1982).
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INTRODUCTION

Few decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
get much press; most could not be described as real "page-turners,"
and few people besides the parties involved and patent lawyers ever.
read them. But Ex ParteAllen,4 decided on April 3, 1987, was different. In Allen the Board upheld in principle the patentability of
higher life forms. Although the Pacific oyster patent in Allen was
rejected on other grounds-the Board found it was "obvious" in
light of well-known techniques in the field'-the decision set the
stage for a larger debate over the future direction of animal patents.
Even now, after the first animal patent has been granted, 6 the debate continues.
Although patent lawyers had been predicting a decision like Allen for some time, it was an occasion for concern and consternation
in other quarters. Animal rights groups saw in it a future full of sad
mutant animals twisted into unnatural forms by greedy and inconsiderate genetic engineers. 7 Farm groups saw the prospect of increased control by giant agri-business corporations, whose demand
for royalties on patented animals would surely become yet another
threat to the ever-decreasing autonomy of the small farmer.' When
United States Senator Mark Hatfield entered the fray with a bill im4. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (1987). Four days after the decision in Allen, the Patent Office issued a notice advising that nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular
organisms, including animals, are patentable under section 101 of the patent statute, 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See Notice by the Commissioner, 1077 PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. GAZETTE
24 (Apr. 21, 1987), excerpted in 33 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 664 (1987).
5. The Patent Office grants a patent when an inventor can show three things: an
invention is the first of its kind, the invention is useful, and it represents a non-trivial
extension of what was known. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty) & 103 (nonobviousness) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See
also 1 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS III-I (1986). In addition, there are two
types of subject matter that cannot be patented: mathematical formulas and natural
laws, and unmodified products of nature. I P. ROSENBERG, supra, at § 6.02[2]. Thus
there is in effect a fourth requirement-that an invention not fall into one of these
categories.
6. See Schneider, HarvardGets Mouse Patent, A World First, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1988,
at A-l, col. 5 (United States Patent 4,736,866 granted to Dr. Philip Leder of Harvard, for
a transgenic mouse engineered to develop cancers not naturally occurring in mice). See
also Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 Jurimetrics J. 399
(1988).
7.- See Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration oflustice of the House Comm. on the Judiczary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (June 11, 1987) [hereinafter Hearings1] (statement ofJohn A. Hoyt,
Humane Society of the United States); The Animal Patenting Decision: Should People Own
New Forms of Life?, The Humane Soc'y News, Summer 1987, at 6 [hereinafter Owning New

8.ife].

8. See Hearings I, supra note 7, at 114 (testimony of Cy Carpenter, President, Na-
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posing a moratorium on animal patents, it was clear that the debate
had far exceeded the usual confines of the patent community.9
The overarching question raised by the opponents of the Allen
decision was this: Should inventors be given proprietary rights in
technologies that are feared by at least some members of society?
Or should we deny patents on inventions that some believe will have
harmful consequences?
This article will address these questions primarily as they relate
to inventions concerning higher life forms.
II.

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY

An introduction to the rudiments of the technology should aid
in understanding what inventions in this field may look like. It also
may help in understanding and evaluating the fears of those who
oppose animal biotechnology research.
Animal biotechnology research can be divided roughly into
three categories, according to the goals of the research: (1) animals
that represent enhanced food sources; (2) animals that are susceptible to human diseases, to help test therapies and cures for those
diseases; and (3) animals that produce human drugs and other nonfood products.
A. Enhanced Food Source Research
The invention at issue in the Allen decision' 0 is an example of
enhanced food source research. That case involved a patent on a
method for making Pacific oysters unable to reproduce." Scientists
found that exposing newly fertilized oyster eggs to extreme water
pressure disrupts the normal allocation of chromosomes during cell
division, leaving the oysters with three copies of each chromosome,
tional Farmers Union); Schneider, Witnesses Clash on Animal Patents, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1987, at A-21, col. 1.
9. Senator Hatfield's moratorium bill was an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill. The amendment prohibited the Patent Office from expending funds on
animal patents for the remainder of Fiscal Year (FY) 1987. See Hatfield Amendment No.
245 to H.R. 1827, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S7322 (daily ed. May 28,
1987). This provision, though approved by the Senate, was later dropped from the bill.
See Briefs: Legislation, Patents, 34 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 277 (1987). It is
probably no coincidence that the last patent decision that received widespread public
attention was Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In this case, where the
Supreme Court upheld the patentability of novel life forms, more than 70 amicus curiae
briefs were filed with the Court on both sides of the issue. 447 U.S. at 316 (amicus briefs
supporting reversal presented "a gruesome parade of horribles").
10. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (1987).
11. Id.
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instead of the normal two (called polyploidy). This makes the oysters sterile and also eliminates their normal two-month reproductive
cycle, during which they are inedible. Thus oysters treated With the
new method can be harvested year-round.
This invention represents a fairly simple example of enhanced
food source research. More sophisticated research involving recombinant gene techniques is also underway, and it is this research that
raises most of the serious questions in the minds of critics.
In recombinant animal research, scientists take genes from one
animal and insert them into the genetic code (DNA) of another
animal, called the host.' 2 They hope that the host animal can be
induced to express the protein which the inserted gene codes for,
enhancing the host animal in some way. Current research goals include making host animals bigger, leaner, and more diseaseresistant. 13
The most commonly used technique for introducing "foreign"
genes into the host is called micro-injection. The idea is relatively
simple: up to one million copies of the desired gene are injected
into a newly fertilized host animal embryo. Of these, a tiny portion
is taken into the. nucleus and, if all goes well, several will integrate
into the host's DNA. With luck, at least one copy will be expressed,
producing the desired protein (e.g., growth hormone, disease antibodies), and will pass to the next generation when the host animal
4
mates.'
Scientists pioneered this technique on relatively simple animals,
such as flies, toads and mice." Now private firms and universities
are spearheading the effort to apply micro-injection to commercially
important animals, such as cows, pigs, and fish.'" Recombinant
12. See Office of Technology Assessment, Transgenic Animals 1-5 (Feb. 1988) (unpublished staff paper of the Office of Technology Assessment Biological Applications
Program, on file with the author) [hereinafter OTA Staff Paper].
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 4.
15. See Brinster, Factors Affecting the Efficiency of Introducng Foreign DA4 into Mlice by

.Iicroinjecting Eggs, 82

PROC. NAT'L ACAD.

Sci. U.S. Am. 4438 (1985); Etkin & Balcells,

Transfor7ned Xenopus Embryos as a Transient Expression System to Analyze Gene Expression at the
Alidblastula Transition, 108 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 173 (1985) (toads); Spradling &
Rubin. The Effect of Chromosomal Position on the Expression of the Drosophila Xanthine

Dehydrogenase Gene, 34 CELL 47 (1983) (flies). Scientists have also used techniques other
than micro-injection. For example, a virus that usually infects pigs has been used to
carry new genes into mice. Elbrecht, DeMayo, Tsai & O'Malley, Episomal llaintenanceof a
Bovine Papilloma Virus Vector in Transgenic Alice, 7 MOLECULAR & CELLULAR BIOLOGY 1276
(1987).
16. See J. Marx, Cloning Sheep and Cattle Embryos, 239 Sci. 463 (1988); Animal Biotech
Update, 8 BIOENGINEERING NEws 1 (25 Aug.-1 Sept. 1987) (cattle breeding research);
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techniques are attracting attention because of their advantages over
conventional breeding practices. It is possible, for example, to produce a new animal line carrying a desired trait much faster, because
the trait can be isolated and quickly introduced into a large number
of host animals. This also allows breeders much greater specificity;
they can unlink desired traits from undesirable ones much more eas7
ily using these techniques.'
B.

Animal Models

Much of the food and drugs we use is tested on animals to make
sure it is safe and, in the case of drugs, effective. Not all human
diseases are shared by animals, however, so some therapies and
drugs are difficult to test before they are given to humans. To solve
this problem, some scientists are attempting to engineer human susceptibilities into animals that would not normally have them. One
example of this line of research is the recombinant mouse described
in the first animial patent, issued to Dr. Philip Leder of Harvard."8
This patent describes a technique for correcting a new strain of mice
whose genomes include a cancer-causing gene from other species;
the mice therefore can be used to study forms of cancer that do not
naturally occur in them, such as human cancers. Another example of
animal model research is the attempt to make laboratory mice or
rats susceptible to infection with the AIDS virus."9 Animal rights
groups often object to this type of research; proponents cite the toll
in human lives that would be taken by direct human testing of experimental drugs. Indeed, studies consistently point to the essential
role of animal models in modern biomedical research.20
Graff, Countless Copies of Choice Cattle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at F-19, col. 1 (same);

Maclean, Penman & Zhu, Introduction of Novel Genes into Fish, 5 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 257
(1987) (introduction of novel vertebrate genes into various fish species and preliminary
evidence for expression of those genes and transmission to next generation).
17. See OTA Staff Paper, supra note 12, at 4-5.
18. See Schneider, supra note 6. Note that this patent actually describes and claims a
general technique for introducing foreign animal susceptibilities into a range of host
animals, including, but not limited to, mice.
19. See Hearings 1, supra note 7, at 48 (statement of Dr. Thomas E. Wagner, Ph.D.,
Director, Edison Animal Biotechnology Center, Ohio State University).
20. See HEALTH BENEFITS OF ANIMAL RESEARCH (NV. Gay ed. 1985) (study by the
Foundation for Biomedical Research); Barnes, Benefits of Animals in Research Described in

New Publication, 232 Sci. 310 (1986) (quoting Dr. Gay: "Recently, animal rights groups
have declared the use of animals in research to be exploitation and have placed a high
priority on its elimination .... [This] would herald the end of biomedical research as we
know it.").
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C. Animals as Product Factories
A small number of scientists are attempting to get laboratory
animals to produce certain commercially useful products not normally made in those animals. One example is the tissue plasminogen activator-producing mouse. 21 Scientists inserted the human
gene coding for the protein known as tissue plasminogen activator
(tPA)-a blood clot dissolver with remarkable effectiveness in heart
feattack victims, in whose hearts dangerous clots often form-into
23
male lab mice. 2 2 The mice secreted the tPA in their milk.
III.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE TECHNOLOGIES

There are four fears voiced by the critics of this technology:
(1) immediate ecological disasters; (2) indirect ecological dangers;
(3) reduction in the gene pool of the world; and (4) ethical dilemmas. The text that follows elaborates on these concerns, and the
next section considers whether the patent system can address them.
A.

Deliberate Release and Immediate Ecological Disasters

The first concern is that recombinant or transgenic animals will
somehow escape confinement, infect other organisms, and cause an
ecological disaster. This was one of the fears that prompted the
Foundation on Economic Trends, led by anti-biotechnology advocateJeremy Rifkin, to file suit, requesting the United States Department of Agriculture to file an environmental impact statement
covering department-sponsored research on animal biotechnology.

24

Although the case was dismissed on other grounds, 25 it is difficult to see how recombinant animals pose a direct threat to the ecological balance.' Such animals usually are kept in captivity, ,nd in
any event, they can mate only with animals of the same species.
Rapid and widespread transmission of genetic material across species boundaries seems highly unlikely.
21. Gordon, Lee, Vitale, Smith, Westphal & Hennighausen, Production of Human Tissue Plasminogen Activator in Transgenic Mouse .lilk, 5 BIO/TECIHNOLoGY 1183 (1987).
22. Id. at 1184.
23. Id.
24. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
25. Id. at 885-86 (affirming dismissal of action because the Department of Agriculture's animal productivity research did not constitute a unified program for purposes of
the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361 (1982)).

1988]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HIGHER LIFE FORMS

B.

1057

Indirect Ecological Dangers

The second objection is that transgenic animals could have a
deleterious effect on ecological balance over the long run. Under
one scenario, transgenic animals, bred to be superior, overcome
natural population limitations and wreak havoc by sheer numbers.
Under another, animals are bred to thrive in heretofore barren areas, leading to a long-term change in the ecological landscape of
those areas. 26
These are more serious worries. Ecology is a young science,
and ecosystems are amazingly complex. Although farmers have
been breeding animals for centuries with seemingly few known catastrophic effects, the possibility exists that accelerated breeding on a
large scale could lead to some unforeseen disaster. Section IV discusses whether the patent system is an appropriate place to address
these concerns.
C. Depleted Gene Pool
This objection to biotechnology is related to the concern about
long-term ecological effects. Scientists are aware of many examples
of populations that have been completely eradicated because of susceptibility to disease or other organic attacks. 27 All such events are
regrettable; we are all lessened by the death of any species. But
those that result from overreliance on a particular species are particularly heinous-they might have been avoided. The fear is that reliance on particular strains of engineered "super" animals would be
dangerous because of the loss of the natural diversity of a "wild"
(i.e., nonengineered) population. This is especially true of animals
developed with the micro-injection cloning technique described
above. To the extent that such genetically identical animals displace
naturally diverse animals, they introduce the risk that all might die
when exposed to a novel disease or pest if the original parent cell
did not include a gene conferring resistance to the new threat.
Without genetic engineering, probably only some would die.
Experience with plants has shown that this can indeed be a
problem.2" But at least some commentators believe that since intellectual property rights have been granted for new sexually repro26. See, e.g., Audubon 1I'ants Biotech Study, 8 BIOENGINEERING NEWS 1 (16 Nov. 1987)
(describing Audubon Society call for major study on possibility that biotechnology rese'irch could lead to irreversible damage, such as destruction of arid climate ecologies).
27. Dutch elm disease is one example.
28. See S. Wrrr, BRIEFBOOK: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC DIVERSITY 67 (1985)
(California Agricultural Lands Project Briefbook No. 2) (the term "genetic diversity"
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ducing plants, the variety of new strains has actually increased.2 9 And
even before biotechnology research, efforts were under way to cre30
ate "seed banks" to preserve the genetic diversity of various crops.
This, together with the prospect of breeding in diversity for traits
other than the engineered one, could alleviate the threat of overreliance on a small number of strains.
D. Ethical Objections
There are two basic ethical objections to patenting animals developed through biotechnology research: concerns with "owning
life" and the notion of "species integrity."
The first concern is reflected in a number of our legal and social
practices. Slavery--owning a human being-is banned under the
Constitution, 3 and the United States Patent Office has declared that
the slavery provision bars patents on improved humans. 3 2 Likewise,
Western legal systems have never permitted free trade in such body
parts as kidneys, 3 although there is a large market for artificial body
parts and medical devices.
Those who object to biotechnology consider intellectual property rights tantamount to ownership and exclusive claims to small
components of living systems to be tantamount to owning life itself.3 4 Firms in the industry, and their patent lawyers, disagree.
They point out that this is an old practice; many patents have been
granted for the use of micro-organisms in fermentation and antibibecame popular during the 1970 Southern Corn Leaf Blight epidemic, said to highlight
dangers of breeding plants from narrow genetic base).
29. See Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights andAgribusiness Research and Development: Implicationsfor the Public Agricultural Research System, 65 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 967 (1983).
30. See, e.g. Gernplasm News, 8 BIOENGINEERING NEws 4 (25 Aug.-I Sept. 1987) (description of National Small Grains Germplasm Research Facility, which stores samples of
wheat, oats, rice, and barley). See also Hawaii Plant Gene Repository, 8 BIOENGINEERING
NEWS 4 (16 Nov. 1987) (describing the opening of the Plant Germplasm Repository for
Tropical Fruit and Nut Crops, to store and maintain strains of, e.g., papaya, breadfruit,
macadamia nuts, pineapple).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery).
32. See Notice by the Commissioner, supra note 4 (stating that nonnaturally-occurring
and-because of the thirteenth amendment, nonhuman-multicellular organisms are

patentable).
33. See U.S.

CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS at 75-76 (1987) (citing the

National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273 (Supp. IV 1986)).
34. See Owning New Life, supra note 7; Lang, Plant Breeders' Rights Bill: There is a Great
Moral Dilemma Posed by the Private Ounership of New Life Forms, 32 CANADIAN LXBOUR 15
(1987).
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otic production, for example.3 5 More importantly, they stress the
benefits of applied biomedical research carried out with the promise
of patent protection-new drugs, better plants, even human gene
therapy for now-incurable diseases. 36 Finally, they emphasize the
limited nature of a patent, which grants a seventeen-year right to
exclude others only from the specific novel element of the invention
it describes. 3 7
Underlying the debate is a philosophical tension that has been
present since Darwin's time. Many biologists tend to view living organisms as very complex chemical systems, different from nonliving
and to
systems primarily in the degree of organization. 38 To them, adt
patent lawyers familier with patents on new chemical compounds,
patents on the modified genetic codes of life forms are a logical extension of current practice. They present no new problems. But for
those who harbor reservations about biotechnology, this is the
source of the problem; they believe that life has special properties
To them, owning life is a
that are beyond the realm of science.
form of secular sacrilege-it violates their fundamental sense of the
35. Louis Pasteur, for example, patented a number of yeast-related inventions. See
Frederico, Louis Pasteur's Patents, 86 Sci. 327 (1937), reprintedin 19J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 966
(1937); Pasteur'sPatents, 20J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 642 (1938). See also Cameron Septic Tank
Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908) (patent for original bacteria-using septic tank).
36. See Hearings I, supra note 7, at 47-49 (statement of Dr. Thomas E. Wagner, Ph.D.,
Director, Edison Animal Biotechnology Center, Ohio State University).
37. See Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (July 22, 1987) [hereinafter HearingsII] (statement of Reid Adler of
the intellectual property law firm of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner).
38. See, e.g., I J. WATSON, N. HOPKINS, J. ROBERTS, J. STErrz & A. WEINER, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 28 (4th ed. 1987) ("[The] almost mystical ideas [of biologists
who believed in a vital life force distinguishing living from nonliving things] never led to
meaningful experiments and, in their vague form, could never be tested. Progress was
made instead only by biologically oriented chemists and physicists patiently attempting
to devise new ways of solving the structures of more and more complex biological molecules."). See also F. JACOB, THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 45 (1982) (describing, in the
course of a lecture on evolution and biotechnology, the religiously inspired but unfounded fears of non-scientists over "tinkering",with living things).
39. See, e.g., Patents and the Constitution: TransgenicAnimals: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., Ist Sess. 396 (Nov. 5, 1987) (statement of Rev. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States); R. Dresser, Ethical and
Legal Issues in PatentingNew Animal Life, 28JURIMETRICS J. 399 (1988). The general term
for this conflict in world views, coined by C.P. Snow in his famous Rede Lecture of 1959,
is the problem of the "two cultures." See C.P. SNow, THE Two CULTURES AND OTHER
ESSAYS (1960). The problem Snow identified has persisted, and in fact may be worsening. See T. Pynchon, Is it O.K. to Be a Luddite?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, § 7 (Book
Review), at I.
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proper order of things.4 ° In addition, they believe it smacks of
hubris, because we are, after all, only one of many species on the
earth. 4 '
The second major ethical objection to patents on higher life
forms centers on the concept of species integrity. Proponents of
this concept believe that species should not be crossed-that each
species has a right to have its genetic composition left alone.4 2 In
this view, transgenic animals should be banned, because producing
them violates the integrity of both the host and the donor species.
Scientists have a hard time with this argument. They point out
that man has been systematically altering species for millennia,
through practices such as cattle breeding, selective crop breeding,
and hybridization. 43 Moreover, the animals currently used as transgenic hosts are themselves the product of human intervention. As
the Office of Technology Assessment reports:
[T]he domestic animals that are now the subjects of transgenic research, and are likely to be for the foreseeable future, are already the products of centuries, and in many
cases millennia, of human manipulation. Whatever integrity they may once have had as biological units has already
been far more altered by human intervention than transgenic manipulations are likely to lead to even within the
next several decades.4 4
In addition to these objections, a young but growing group of
philosophers has begun to fashion a much more general critique of
our society's use of animals. Their criticisms are directed at the entire range of animal-related activities-from eating meat to animal
40. To others, it represents yet another example of the denial of animals' basic
rights. One animal rights defender has even coined the phrase "speciesist" to describe
someone who makes a distinction between species on "irrelevant" bases. P. SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 7 (1975).
41. See, e.g., Kass, Patenting Life, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 571, 599 (1981) (discussing
hubris inherent in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), holding that bacterial
life form is patentable). Scientists sense a much greater degree of hubris in the scenarios of animal patent opponents. Such "achievements" as hybrid human-monkeys and
two-headed cats are a long way from being possible with the techniques known today.
Cf. 1'hat Price Mighty louse, The Atlantic Monthly, May 23, 1988, at 7, 8 ("What scientists are actually doing is taking a very mundane, single human gene and inserting it in a
very mundane organism.... So far, none of the bacteria have sprouted ears or started
carrying briefcases, and we don't expect them to any time soon.").
42. See generallyJ. RIFKIN, ALGENY (1984).
43. See, e.g., OTA Staff Paper, supra note 12, at 11 (species integrity argument has
"no known foundation in biology"); HearingsH,supra note 37, at 117, 120 (statement of
Dr. A. Ann Sorenson, American Farm Bureau Federation).
44. OTA Staff Paper, supra note 12, at 11.
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research.4" On this view animal patenting is only the newest invasion of animals' inherent rights. While this is not the place (and I
am not the person) to mount a full critique of these positions, it
seems important to make several basic points.
Animal rightists argue that animals have a consciousness that is
qualitatively similar to that of humans.4 6 From this, they proceed to
the notion that animals have a distinct form of autonomy, similar to
but less developed than full human autonomy.4 7 Thus animals are
deprived of this important feature-autonomy-when confined, experimented on, or eaten. The conclusion, with some modifications, 4 is that animals possess minimum inherent rights which must
be respected. One problem with this line of reasoning stems from
its opening assumption that human and animal consciousness is
qualitatively similar. There is no reason to. take this assumption as
true. If language is a proper criterion on which to judge consciousness, for example, the assumption obviously fails. If Regan were
criticized for equating admittedly less-developed animal autonomy
with full-blown human autonomy, on what basis could he respond?
We have come too far in our understanding of the contingent and
socially mediated nature of categories and distinctions to accept at
face value an argument about inherent qualitative similarity. That is
to say, scholars may choose to accept a certain distinction, but if
they choose otherwise, they will not be ignoring a qualitative similarity, they will simply be defining it out of existence.
More importantly, even accepting for the sake of argument the
qualitative similarity between human and animal 'Consciousness, animals and humans still can be distinguished without doing wrong or
being evil. This is because animal rightists' arguments are, at heart,
arguments about consistency, logic, or coherence, not about ineluc-

45. See, e.g., T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); B. BOLLIN, ANIMAL

RIGHTS ANt) HUMAN MORALITY (1981); Regan, An Examination and Defense of One Argument
Concerning Animal Rights, 22 INQUIRY 189 (1979). See also Dresser, Respecting and Protecting
Nonhuman Animals: Regan's The Casefor Animal Rights, 1984 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 831

(reviewing Regan's book and related literature); Nozick, About Mammals and People, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 1983, § 7 (Book Review), at 11 (reviewing Regan's book and discussing
issues it raises).
46. T. REGAN, supra note 45, at 28.
47. Id. at 84-86.
48. Although he rejects utilitarianism, for instance, Regan recognizes that even an
individual rights-based conception of ethics would allow four human survivors in a rowboat to kill and eat a fifth, or to throw overboard even a million dogs, because the magnitude of harm to each individual in each case would be greater if the fifth human
survivor were not eaten or if the dogs were not thrown overboard. Id. at 324-25.
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table right and wrong.4 9 And, as Arthur Leff has written, "[I]llogic,
irrationality, and incoherence are not evil, unless one declares them
so, presumably in the normal fashion, by assertion.... Briefly, intellectual coherence is intellectual coherence; it becomes something
else-right, good, noble-only if so stipulated."50 The choice about
how to treat animals, like the choice about whether to accept consistency as the key criterion of our ethical system, is in the end society's
to make. Society is not compelled by the presence of consciousness
or any other attribute to act in any particular way at all.
IV.

CAN THE PATENT SYSTEM ADDRESS THESE. CONCERNS?

Whether or not the ethical and other concerns of biotechnology
opponents have merit, for reasons outlined below, the patent office
is not the proper place to address these concerns.
A.

History as a Guide: Patentsfor "Immoral" Inventions

What the opponents of biotechnology seek-to deny patents
for subject matter they consider immoral-is not unknown in the
history of patent law. From the early nineteenth century until midway through this century, courts often were willing to withhold patents on inventions they considered immoral. These inventions fell
chiefly into two classes: (1) inventions used to defraud buyers, and
(2) machines used for gambling. Moral worth proved to be a difficult test of patentability-a fact which should give pause to those
anxious to revive it.
The concept of immoral subject matter is thought to have
originated in dictum from a Joseph Story opinion. 5 The question
before the court was whether the patent at issue described an inven49. Regan, for example, ultimately bases his animal ethics on a sort of modified intuitionism. He says moral intuitions are a good guide to action, so long as they reflect
'considered beliefs." T. REGAN, supra note 45, at 121-49. Considered beliefs. of
course,
are the necessary "filter" a philosopher must construct to counter the possibility that
intuitions will lead to racial prejudice and other reprehensible things. Only intuitions
that measure up to the criteria of a considered belief are said to be "valid." Id. at 13640. Thus even intuition is not always an accurate source of moral guidance; it too must
be measured against Regan's plausible but by no means objectively grounded criteria. It
is consistency with this criteria, and not conformance to an unquestionable standard of
right and wrong, that is the ultimate test of a moral judgment.
50. Left, 11enorandum (Book Review), 29 STAN. L. REv. 879, 881 (1977). See also Left,
Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. .1229 (concluding that without an unquestioned generator or unquestionablejudgments, e.g.. a God, there is no such thing as
an unchallengeable evaluative system, and thus no way to prove one ethical system, e.g.,
one based on logic or consistency, superior to any other).
51. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
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tion that was useful-utility, along with novelty, was the test for patentability at the time.5 2 Judge Story rejected the defendant's
contention that the plaintiff's patent was invalid for want of utility;
he went on to say that "the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover,
if the invention be of mischievous or injurious tendency. ' 53 As examples, he cited patents to "poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination." 5 4
This doctrine was invoked often in the late nineteenth century
to deny patents on gambling devices. 5 5 Interestingly, it was a successful bar to patentability even where inventions appeared to be
useful for things other than gambling.5 6 Patents were struck down
on this basis well into the twentieth century, 5 7 and even as late as
1941, in a pinball machine patent case, the Seventh Circuit was care58
ful to note the distinction between playing pinball and gambling.
By the 19 7 0s, however, the courts were regularly upholding patents
on gambling devices-both because gambling was no longer seen as
a major moral issue, and because courts had become more wary of
denying patents on the basis of an indeterminate moral standard.5 9
The fight against immoral inventions was not limited to patents
for gambling devices. Another line of cases denied patents for inventions that could be used only to defraud. In one leading case,
the Second Circuit invalidated a patent on a process for artificially
producing spots on domestic tobacco, finding that the sole use for
the process was to make domestic tobacco resemble fine grades of
52. Id. at 1019. See also Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New StandardsforPatents, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 293, 303-15 (describing the history of tests of patentability).
53. 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
54. Id.

55. See, e.g., Reliance Novelty Corp. v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902, 904 (N.D. Cal. 1897)
(patent on design for slot machine cover struck down for lack of utility). See generally 1 D.
CHISUM, PATENTS, § 4.031l] (1977, rev. 1988) (general description of the doctrine and
its history).
56. See, e.g., Schultz v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (patent on coin return
device for coin-operated machines denied because it had application to slot machines);
National Automatic Device Corp. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1889) (patent on toy
horse race course denied on evidence that toy course was used in bars for betting
purposes).
57. See, e.g., Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. Il. 1936) (patent
denied on "game of chance" vending machine, where user inserted coin and tried to
manipulate miniature steam shovel to scoop up a toy). But see Fuller v. Berger, 120 F.
274, 281 (7th Cir. 1903) (reversing denial of patent for mechanism to detect bogus
coins, due to use in slot machines).
58. Chicago Patent v. Genco, Inc., 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (upholding
patent on pinball machine). But cf Meyer, 15 F. Supp. at 641.
59. See, e.g., Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 803 (1977) (upholding claim
for "one-armed bandit").
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imported tobacco. 6 ° This was in keeping with other cases holding
that patents could be granted only for devices having no fraudulent
uses.

61

Cases on medicinal products make up a special class of"fraudulent use" cases. Beginning in the nineteenth century, courts were
wary of placing the government's imprimatur on medicines and devices hawked to an unsuspecting public in the free-wheeling days
before the establishment of an effective Food and Drug Administration (FDA).6" The result was a higher standard of utility for healthrelated inventions, vestiges of which still can be seen in patent cases
and patent office practices. 6 3
Now that a powerful FDA has far-reaching powers to regulate
drugs and medical devices, however, courts are increasingly willing
to focus on functional utility rather than clinical safety when medical
patents are at issue.' The rationale for this more limited role is to
avoid duplication of effort. As one court stated, "[T]o require the
Patent Office to make an affirmative finding as to the safety of a drug
for human use would work a serious overlapping of the respective
' 65
jurisdictions of the Patent Office and the FDA.
What conclusions can be drawn from the attempts of the courts
to enforce moral norms by denying patents? First, as in the case of
gambling devices, moral norms--or at least the courts' perceptions
of them-change over time. One leading patent casebook'implies
that changes in moral norms are at least in part a function of the
very thing patents are supposed to bring about-new technologies:
Birth control devices, in a period of thirty to forty years,
60. Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900).
61. See, e.g., Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.1 433, 468 (1873) (affirming trial court
jury instruction on utility which stated that inventions with no honest uses were unpatentable). See also In re Corbin, 6 F. Cas. 538, 542 (C.C.D.C. 1857) (No. 3,224) (upholding grant of patent on artificial honey).
62. See, e.g., Mahler v. Animarium Co., 11 F. 530, 537 (8th Cir. 1901) (patent denied
for medical device using electricity to cure diseases). Indeed, firms often used their
patents as a selling tool, thus giving "patent medicines" a bad name. See E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 808 (3d ed. 1986).
63. 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 55, at § 4.04[21; Brand, Utility in a PharmaceuticalPatent,
39 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 480 (1984). See generally Note, Ethical Considerationsin the Patenting of Medical Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139 (1987).
64. This has been the trend for some time. See, e.g., In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383,
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (refusing to invalidate patent for anti-depressant drug Monase,
despite FDA's suspension of drug because of acute side-effects); In re Hartop, 311 F.2d
249, 260 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (rejecting argument that patent for thiobarbituric acid was
invalid for lack of utility due to potential for dangerous side effects).
65. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 433 F.2d 1034, 1039 n.7 (2d

Cir. 1970).
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have come from a position of illegality to a position where
they are welcomed by some as a means of curbing a population explosion. Thus, in determining "utility" based on
public mores, the courts should apply a test which will not
penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be
anticipating basic needs of a society 6changed
by forces yet
6
unrecognized by the general public.
A second conclusion is that even in those cases where moral
norms have been invoked to deny patents, the inventions at issue
posed a direct threat to a readily identifiable norm-a marked contrast to the case of biotechnology inventions. Gambling, for example, was considered bad in itself; gambling devices were used
directly to perform an immoral act. Bogus medicines were the
same-they were themselves the instruments of fraud. Biotechnology, at least at this state, arguably presents a different situation. If
the norm is species integrity or natural species barriers, today's recombinant researchers are no more culpable than the myriad natural mechanisms for the transfer of genetic material-viruses, for
*67
instance.
But even conceding that biotechnology is analogous to gambling or selling fake medicines, another problem remains: what are
the limits of the immorality test? How far into the future can the
patent challenger look for the immoral effects of an invention, and
what consensus version of morality can the courts rely on?
For example,' historians and sociologists have long noted the
profound social changes that accompanied the invention of the automobile. Some of these changes had unquestionable moral dimensions, such as the impact of automobiles on the incidence of
premarital sex. Assuming these changes could have been foreseen,
immoral use might have been raised as a reason not to enforce the
patent.6" A host of other technologies, e.g., cattle prods (sometimes
66. R. CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 76 (3d ed. 1987).
67. See, e.g., G. TORTORA, B. FUNKE & C. CASE, MICROBIOLOGY: AN INTRODucTION
339-76 (1986) (chapter on viruses); 1J. WATSON, supra note 38, at 205-08 (description of
"transduction," a process whereby viral particles carry bacterial genes from one organism to another). See generally L. THOMAS, Organelles as Organisns, in THE LIVES OF A CEtL
69 (1974) (speculating on the basis of research findings that many sub-cellular components such as mitochondria were separate organisms that integrated themselves into our
cells early in our evolution, implying that man is actually a composite of many "subspecies").
68. See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911).
This case concerned the famous "Selden Patent," United States Patent No. 549,160,
granted in 1895, a broad patent encompassing essentially the early automobile. The
court found that the patent challengers (including Ford Motors) had not infringed the

1066

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 47:1051

used in torture) and abortion-inducing drugs (safer than procedures, but considered immoral by some), can be thought of in this
vein.
Even under the traditional immoral use doctrine, however,
courts sometimes held that an invention was patentable so long as it
had some nonimmoral applications.6 9 Thus some classes of biotechnology-related inventions still might be patentable under a sort
of moral balancing test-those that prevented degenerative childhood muscular dystrophy, for example. In these cases the norm
concerning species integrity presumably would bow to a broader
humanitarian sense of morality.
B.

Inventions Involving Nuclear Energy

The opposition to biotechnology research often carries the
faint echoes of the antinuclear movement. Because some of the
moral claims are the same-particularly those directed at society's
duty to future generations-it might be instructive to see how the
patent system treats nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry patents.
In general, patents are granted in this field the same as in any
other. The only exception is for civilian inventions that may have
military applications. In this case, the patent application is reviewed
by the Department of Defense to see if there are any weapons-related uses for the invention.7 ° If there are only defense applications, the Defense Department can obtain all rights to the invention,
but it must compensate the inventor.7 ' If there are civilian as well as
military applications, the inventor must surrender rights to the military uses. 7 2 This is interpreted narrowly; the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals held in 1980 that this provision only applies if an
invention has absolutely no function other than as an atomic
patent by making its own model automobiles-a decision reversing, at the end of the
patent's life, a long string of victories for Selden. 184 F. at 915.
69. See supra, note 61.
70. This is done in accordance with the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No.
82-256, 66 Stat. 1 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1982)). Under this
Act, whose predecessors date from 1917, the Patent Office is instructed to review all
patent applications for military content. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1982). The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, carrying over certain prior provisions of law, prohibited the patenting of
nuclear inventions with only military applications. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073,
§ 1, 68 Stat. 943 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1982)). The Act also gives
the government an exclusive license to the military applications of any nuclear invention
having both military and civilian applications. 42 U.S.C. § 2183(b) (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2187 (1982).
72. Id.§ 2181(b).
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weapon. 73
National security concerns, rather than moral considerations,
are at the heart of these provisions. 74 Thus the patent system constrains nuclear energy-related inventions in a number of ways, but it
does so to keep information out of the hands of those who would
misuse them, The goal is not to place a disincentive in the path of
development, but rather to keep developments out of the hands of
those who would misuse them. The law does not enact a moral
norm; instead, it enforces the military norm of secrecy.
There are obviously great differences between nuclear weapons
and recombinant gene technology. The former has no beneficial
uses; the latter has many. It would have been grotesque if a nuclear
physicist had argued in 1946 that the government should give incentives for the private development and sale of nuclear weapons. Yet
in the first hearing on animal patents, Dr. Thomas Wagner, a prominent molecular biologist noted for his research on gene transfers in
animals, spoke for the overwhelming majority of his colleagues
when he advocated patent protection for new inventions pertaining
to animal traits on the grounds that there are and will be many benefits from such research. 75
By contrast, there are known, severe dangers, as well as a complete absence of benefits, in the case of nuclear weapons. Thus, even
if one chooses to view the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act as a
kind of moral objection to patenting nuclear weapons, these weapons still would constitute a rare, limiting case-a technology we do
not want to encourage.
C.

Inventions and MoralJudgments: Summary

Based on the preceding sections several conclusions can be
made. First, patent protection for a new technology normally
should not be denied on the basis of speculation about potential
negative consequences, such as those suggested by opponents of
animal patents. 76 The patent system normally is not the proper
73. In re Brueckner, 623 F.2d 184, 187 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
74. See, e.g., legislative history of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, supra note 70; S.
REP. No. 1001, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. REP. No. 1028, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951). See also Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (fundamental
purpose of the Invention Secrecy Act was to continue in peacetime the authority to prevent dissemination of information contained in patent applications whenever that information would endanger national security).
75. Hearings I, supra note 7, at 39.
76. In fact, it can be argued that even in the regulatory context, new technologies
normally should not be prohibited on the basis of speculative fears over their impact.
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place to conduct technology assessment. Its purpose is much simpler-"to promote the progress of science and useful arts," according to the Constitution. 7 7
Second, patents on animals should not be excluded because of
arguments about their potential social consequences. Those
problems, if they eventually arise, should be dealt with outside the
patent law. The FDA, for example, now handles questions about
the safety and efficacy of drugs; the considerable regulatory structure that has grown up around biotechnology is the proper place to
address concerns about potential deleterious effects of animal
patents.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT OF ANIMAL PATENTS

At least in the short term, the problems engendered by animal
patents are likely to be less earth-shattering than the ones identified
so far. Most of these problems will stem from the fact that animals
are self-reproducing. Unlike other patented technologies, humans will
not have to intervene for a patented animal to be "copied."
The self-reproducing feature of animals will have one of two
effects, depending on the normal function of the animal and the
goal of the people involved in its reproduction. Under current law,
if the purchaser or licensee of a patented animal intentionally
breeds it, or tries to copy its patented features in the laboratory,
with the goal of attempting to maintain and reproduce the patented
trait, the purchaser probably will be liable for patent infringement..
But if the animal is simply permitted to mate with other, nonpatented animals under normal pen or cage conditions, the law is unclear as to whether liability will attach. This gap in current law-and
the uncertainty it creates-provides the rationale for the farmer's
exemption discussed in the next section.
To understand the law as it relates to intentional reproduction
of the patented feature, consider the example of a research laboratory which buys or licenses a patented rat. Suppose the rat has been
engineered so that it contains a defective human gene which causes
The opposite scenario-the dangers of holding a new technology back-malso should be
weighed in the balance. See H. KAHN, W. BROWN, & L. MARTEL, THE NEXT 200 YEARS

167-73 (1976). See generally J. Krier & C. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985) (reviewing implications of technological optimism in

a democratic system, and expressing fear that our reliance on technological fixes poses
grave dangers given the combination of possibly rapid, irreversible disasters from modem technologies and the lack of advance planning inherent in our crisis-oriented
democracy).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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a common disease in humans. The patentee sells the rat to laboratories who want to test the effectiveness of drugs against the disease."
To avoid paying more royalties, the owners of the research laboratory could mate the rat with one of their own and hope that half of
the offspring exhibit the patented feature. The patentee would argue that the laboratory was infringing its patent.
A line of Supreme Court cases provides the authority for this
argument. Under these cases the Court has held that while the purchaser or licensee of a patented product may use or resell the product, or even replace worn-out components, the entire product may
not be reconstructed when its useful life is over." Thus so long as
the patentee could prove that the infringer intentionally mated the
patented animal, with the goal of reproducing the patented trait,
infringement probably would be established.8 0
As a practical matter, it would not be difficult for the patentee
to prove infringement. Molecular biologists have devised a number
of techniques for determining the presence of a specific gene or sequence. Patentees no doubt would find it worth their while to apply
these techniques to the development of simple tests that would indicate the presence of the patented gene or sequence in offspring of
the animal.
In addition, license agreements can be expected to resolve
many potentially troublesome issues. Such issues as the right of the
patentee to test for infringing offspring, and the right to prohibit the
resale of patented animals for breeding purposes, can be expected
to be solved in this manner. In other areas where intellectual property rights involve difficult problems of infringement and enforcement, such as in the licensing of computer software, the parties
involved have demonstrated a high degree of creativity in drafting
contractual solutions to these problems.
In sum where a customer tries to perpetuate a patented trait,
infringement is clear. Moreover, the existence of sound law in this
area will provide a solid framework within which parties to license
78. This is not far-fetched; the Leder patent, supra note 6, could be used as the basis
of a lab supply business where patented, engineered mice are sold to the public.
79. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346
(1961); Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 95 (1882); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1868).
80. Unintentional mating outside the breeder's control, however, might be a different story. The intent to reproduce the trait would best reveal itself if, for example, the
purchaser of the patented animal began to sell the offspring of the animal containing the
trait. Such an obvious attempt to set up a business competing with the patentee's would
clearly establish infringement.
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agreements may bargain over the details of enforcement and the
like. But what about incidental or unintentional reproduction as a
result of normal breeding activities? The rules here are far less
clear, making a farmer's exemption a logical solution.
'A.

Necessity for a Limited Livestock Farmer'sExemption

As mentioned above, unintentional copying of the patented
trait via routine reproduction presents an ambiguous situation
under existing law. In reality, this copying will probably not be of
much concern to companies in the business of supplying research
animals, because those animals are easy to keep separate. It is likely
to be a real problem, however, with farmers.
Farmers will want to use patented animals (and their descendants) for normal breeding with the other animals on their own
farms. For reasons outlined below, this is a problem area where private, contractual solutions are unlikely to be effective. Thus there
exists a need for a limited livestock farmer's exemption from infringement liability.
The exemption would closely parallel the provisions of the
farmer's crop exemption of the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970,8" which reads as follows:
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to
save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of
the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in
the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale [to
another farmer without use of a middleman]. 8 2
The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) protects sexually reproduced varieties of plants; it is the only intellectual property statute in American law that has ever dealt with the question of selfreproducing subject matter. 83 Equally important, it was drafted
with a sensitivity to the practical problems of farmers who have to
cope with intellectual property rights over their primary source of
livelihood. The PVPA therefore provides an excellent starting place
to look for solutions to the practical problems farmers will be faced
with in the area of animal patents.
Such an exemption would not destroy the market for a paten81. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1982)).
82. Pub. L. No. 91-577, § 121, 84 Stat. 1555 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1982)).
83. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 applies only to asexually reproduced plants. See
Plant Patent Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 376 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1982)).
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tee's invention, because of a phenomenon known as "genetic drift."
Even in the first generation of offspring from a patented animal (assuming it was not mated with another that possessed the patented
trait), only a maximum of sixty percent of the offspring, and quite
84
likely a much smaller percentage, would possess the patented trait.
As a consequence, farmers who wanted the advantages of a patented
animal would soon have to buy or license a new one, even with an
exemption for on-farm breeding. Thus the exemption would not
undercut in any serious way the financial incentives for patentees to
engage in research and development of new animals.
A similar situation prevails with respect to seeds protected by
the PVPA. The farmer's crop exemption has not severely undermined the efficacy of the PVPA, because farmers typically have to
buy new seeds after two or three years. Again, genetic drift is the
reason.8 5 In addition, there is some evidence that seed companies
have taken the exemption into account, and have adjusted the prices
of the protected seed to reflect a two- or three-year useful life.8 6
In any event, the, farmer's exemption in the PVPA has not reduced the effectiveness of that statute, which is generally credited
with inspiring a very substantial increase in the number of productive new plant varieties developed in the United States.8 7 And it has
helped to ensure that farmers will reap the benefits of new varieties
without excessive and burdensome involvement in the enforcement
84.
Approximate Heritability Rates for Selected
Characteristics in Livestock and Poultry
Percentage
Characteristic

Dairy
Cattle

Beef
Cattle

Hogs

Poultry

Number born
5
10
Birth weight
60
40
5
Weight at weaning
25
10
Mature weight
60
50
Milk production
25
Egg production
35
Feed efficiency
40
30
Percent lean meat
40
35
Source: D. ACKERS, ANIMAL SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY, Table 18-1 (3d ed. 1983).
85. See W. LESSER & R. MASSON, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PL-N'r VARIETY PROTECTION ACT 123 (1985).
86. See W. Lesser, Applying Animal Patents in Agriculture, at 9 (June 4 & 5, 1987)
(unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on the Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, Ithaca, N.Y.; on file with author).
87. See W. LESSER & R. MASSON, supra note 85; Evenson, supra note 29.
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of seed companies' proprietary rights."8
Thus there is little danger that a farmer's exemption would severely reduce the incentive effect of patent protection for animals.
This would be especially true if the exemption were explicitly limited to true farmers, i.e., as in the PVPA exemption those "whose
primary farming occupation is the [raising] of [animals] for sale for
other than reproductive purposes."89
While only minimally reducing the incentive effect of patent
protection, such an exemption would help farmers in a number of
ways. First, it would ensure that they will not be saddled with burdensome recordkeeping and patent enforcement duties. Although
the burden of establishing infringement is normally upon the patentee, patent licensing agreements might require farmers to keep
records to avoid infringement liability. An exemption would remove this burden. This would be especially important to the United
States beef cattle industry, because beef cattle reproduce freely on
the open plain, making recordkeeping of specific matings virtually
impossible. 9 ° Even outside the beef cattle industry, recordkeeping
by small farmers raising dairy cows and hogs would be onerous.
Second, a farmer's exemption would reduce uncertainty. Under
present law, it is simply not clear whether a farmer who allowed a
patented animal to breed would be infringing the patent. 9' A
farmer's exemption would make clear that a farmer would have no
liability for infringement in these circumstances-so long as the
farmer was not breeding a patented animal just to reproduce the
patented trait or to sell offspring for breeding purposes.
Third, a statutory farmer's exemption would prevent patentees
from using the threat of patent infringement to extract major concessions from farmers negotiating license agreements. In the absence of an exemption, for example, the parties might bargain for a
license containing two clauses: (1) a provision stating that royalties
are to be paid for the first and second generation of the patented
animal but not for the third generation and beyond-i.e., a contractual version of the exemption; and (2) a provision restricting the
farmer's right to resell the animal, or requiring the farmer to
88. See Lesser, Patenting Seeds in the United States of America: lI'hat to Expect, 25 INDUS.
360, 364 (Sept. 1986).
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1982).
90. See W. Lesser, supra note 86, at 8.
91. Recall that the old Supreme Court cases prohibited reconstruction of a patented
product, but of course said nothing about products that "reconstruct" themselves without human intervention. See cases cited supra note 79.
PROP.
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purchase unpatented ancillary products (e.g., special feeds or hormones) which the patentee claims are necessary to make the
animal's patented trait more effective. In such a situation, the
farmer would not be able to challenge the restrictive clause (number
two above) as a violation of the antitrust laws, for fear that if the
license agreement were declared invalid, the farmer would no
longer be protected by the first clause. Farmers might easily fear
that if a court invalidates the entire agreement, third generation
(and beyond) animals that would have been exempt from royalty
payments under the licensing agreement might be found to infringe
the patent; as a result, they would be unlikely to challenge restrictive
clauses in the agreement.
B.

Research Exemption

The only other change in current law that Congress might consider is exemption from liability for research uses of a patented
animal. Actually, this is but one aspect of a larger problem-the
scope of the general research exemption in patent law. This exemption is not part of the patent statute; it was created by courts in a line
of cases whose continuing validity is open to question.9 2 The basic
rule-though by no means unequivocally accepted-is that a patentee will not be allowed to prevent experimentation using a patented
product or process for bona fide research activities designed to further scientific knowledge.
While this entire area of patent law could stand some clearsighted legislation, clarity is especially important for animal research. This is because of the large amount of research that is conducted by public agencies in the agricultural sector-especially the
United States Agricultural Research Service and the state agricultural experiment stations. With the heavy involvement of the public
sector in mind, Congress exempted research uses from infringement under the Plant Variety Protection Act.9 3 Congress should
consider doing the same for animal research.
One of the few clear rules that emerges from the sketchy contours of the research exemption doctrine in the courts is this: research aimed at commercialization does not fall under the
exemption, and so constitutes infringement.9 4 Public research
92. See, e.g., 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 55, at § 16.03[1].
93. See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1982).
94. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 55, at § 16.031]. Note that under this principle, if a
patentee sells his or her patented product primarily to research scientists, an infringer
cannot sell copies of the product without infringing. In this sense, the exemption does
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agencies in agriculture are not involved in basic research. Their
mission, which they perform admirably, is to supply farmers with
new tools for increased productivity. They are involved in dissemination, not just research. 95 Thus there is a likelihood that their activities will not qualify for the exemption, and therefore their
research will be restricted by patents on animals. Patents therefore
will prevent public researchers (in the absence of licenses) from investigating ways to improve the patented animals that are developed
in the private sector.
Experience in seed research proves why this might be detrimental. Although in 1957 the private sector supplied ninety-five percent
of the hybrid corn varieties used on American farms, today roughly
eighty percent of the hybrid varieties in use came from public research agencies.9 6 This is the type of interaction between public
and private sectors that would be fostered by a research exemption
for patented animals. With the public and private sectors both
working actively on state-of-the-art animal research, farmers would
be the clear winners.
Although a research exemption no doubt will raise concerns in
the private sector, which will see it as a threat to the incentive structure of the patent system, these concerns have no foundation. In
the field of seed research, spending by the private sector-and the
number of new varieties introduced-have risen sharply since the
passage of the PVPA in 1970. 9 7 Clearly the research exemption will
not substantially harm the private sector; why did seed researchers
invest in new varieties after passage of the PVPA if the exemption
had significantly diluted the incentive effect of the Act? All a research exemption will do is help farmers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Patents for animals have no proven harmful consequences, but
offer many benefits. There is no reason to invoke the nuclear analogy at this stage of the debate, and thereby prevent this new technology
from claiming its rightful place in the American system of intellecnot apply to a market, i.e., all researchers, but instead to an activity, i.e., researching a
patented product with an eye toward understanding it or (arguably) improving it.
95. See Evenson, Agrictlture, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSSINDUSTRY ANALYSIS 233 (1982).

See also Fox, Patents Encroaching on Research Freedom, 224

Sci. 1080 (1984) (anecdotal evidence that biotechnology patents may have slowed down
certain lines of research). See gennrally Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE LJ. 177 (1987).

96. Evenson, supra note 95, at 265.
97. See Evenson, supra note 29. at 971.

1988]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HIGHER LIFE FORMS

1075

tual property. There are, however, sound reasons to consider two
limited exemptions from patent infringement liability: a farmer's
livestock exemption and a research exemption.
The first exemption is important because it will keep farmers
from becoming "patent police" on their own farms. The second exemption would be beneficial because of the important interplay between public and private sector research in the agricultural industry.
Both are sound, hard-headed ways for Congress to provide sensible
"farm aid" to those who will bear some of the costs of the new era of
animal research, while still recognizing the importance of intellectual property rights in encouraging agricultural innovation.
No one should think that allowing patents on higher life forms
has put an end to the debate over biotechnology, however. There is
still much to learn about the powerful new discoveries driving this
technology. Opponents of Ex Parte Allen 9" will proceed on other
fronts and, in some of these fights, they will deserve support. Policies that lead to the devastation of the earth or drastic reductions in
genetic diversity should be opposed, and if this requires limitations
on the applications of biotechnology, so be it.
But avenues of scientific research must not be closed off in fear
of what we will find out. Technology is neither inherently good nor
inherently bad-it just is, until it is applied in a specific context. Patents on new technology should be granted, reserving the right to
regulate specific applications. This is the only sensible course.

98. 2 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1425 (1987).

